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Abstract 
This paper analyses the transitions of temporary workers to the standard employment 
contract and to unemployment. Adopting a comparative framework in an attempt to 
identify whether labour market institutions parameterise outcome, four countries with 
different forms of market structuration are analysed: France, West-Germany, Denmark 
and the UK. Using the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP), 
spanning a period from 1995 to 2001, temporary workers’ transitions are investigated 
using event history analysis techniques (Allison 1984; Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
This paper establishes higher rates of transition to permanent employment than to 
unemployment for most temporary workers, though strong between-country differences 
are found.  
Keywords: contracts, event history analysis, cross-national analysis. 
JEL: J41, J62. 
 
1. Temporary Employment, Bridge or Trap?  
Unusually for academe, most agree that temporary jobs are of inferior quality and status 
to permanent jobs. This consensus is apparent across disciplines, with publications in 
both sociology and economics confirming the lower wages and inferior occupational 
status of temporary workers (i.e. OECD 2002; Booth Francesconi and Frank 2002; 
Kalleberg Reskin and Hudson 2000). With 14 percent of workers on temporary 
contracts across the European Union (Eurostat 2006, p.259), the implications are 
considerable. Yet, temporary employment has a potentially redeeming feature: it is 
thought to provide a point of entry to the standard employment contract for those who 
may otherwise remain unemployed. Therefore this paper focuses on the presumed 
redeeming characteristic of temporary employment: its ability to integrate workers to 
the standard employment contract. It does so by assessing the relative proportions of 
temporary workers who go on to either obtain a permanent contract or are fired/dropped 
at the end of their contract and become unemployed. The dichotomy between these two 
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outcomes was chosen as a stark illustration of the capacity of contract employment to 
integrate or marginalise. While unemployment is not the only risk temporary workers 
face; temporary workers are also exposed to repeat spells of temporary work (i.e. 
Giesecke and Groβ 2003; Gash and McGinnity 2007), unemployment remains a clear 
indicator of temporary work’s inability to integrate workers. Some authors have 
investigated the transitions of temporary workers to permanent employment (i.e. Booth 
et al. 2000), though few have been able to conduct multi-country comparisons. As 
national variation in institutional structure is thought to influence individuals at the 
micro-level (i.e. Mayer 2004; Blossfeld Buchholz and Hofäcker 2006), this paper 
presents a comparative analysis of four countries with very different institutional 
structures: France, West-Germanyi, Denmark and the United-Kingdom. Such an 
analysis has only recently been made possible through the collection of cross-national 
comparative panel data in the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). 
This paper uses the full panel sequence, spanning a period from 1995 through to 2001, 
and through careful data construction observes and measures the transitions of 
temporary workers through time.  
 
2. Theory and Expectations 
The majority of the literature on temporary employment presents us with a ‘good-job’ 
versus ‘bad-job’ scenario, where temporary jobs and the outcomes of temporary 
employment are compared to permanent employment. Most of the research on the topic 
establishes temporary work to be of inferior quality, with temporary workers found to 
have lower wages (Mertens and McGinnity 2004; Gash and McGinnity 2007) fewer 
benefits (McGovern Smeaton and Hill 2004; Houseman 2001) and to have reduced 
access to employer-provided training (OECD 2002). From the employee’s perspective, 
temporary work is, nonetheless, thought to have some redeeming characteristics. First, 
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some argue that workers voluntarily choose temporary employment for its flexibility 
(Polivka 1996). Second, temporary employment is thought to provide a ‘bridge’ to the 
standard employment contract (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002). The literature 
reviewed below presents theories that regard temporary contracts as either a ‘bridge’ to 
permanent employment, or a ‘trap’ leading to unemployment.  
 
Theories Predicting a Bridge 
Broadly the theories reviewed below regard the employment of workers on temporary 
contracts as an opportunity for employees to either prove themselves on the job, or as a 
means to flexibilise a rigid market and thereby render it more amenable to all labour 
market transitions.  
 
At their most basic one can regard temporary contracts as a form of ‘probationary 
contract’, where workers are hired for a short period so that employers can screen their 
skills and abilities before offering them a standard contract (Wang and Weiss 1998; 
Henguelle 1994). Such a perspective would predict a reasonable flow of workers from 
temporary contracts to permanent contracts and would, moreover, predict greater 
recourse to this form of ‘probationary contract’ in markets where employers’ 
information concerning skills and capabilities is bound by poor skills development and 
co-ordination (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999) such as the UK and to some 
extent France (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin and Tåhlin 2001). One of the limitations of 
screening theories is that they fail to recognise employers’ differential use of probation 
by skill. The transaction costs of screening are expected to be too costly for a lower 
skilled job. For this reason we can expect a greater proportion of highly skilled 
temporary workers to be “on probation” than lower skilled temporary workers, and can 
therefore expect more transitions to permanent employment for highly skilled workers.  
  4 
 
The expectation that a considerable portion of temporary work will lead to permanent 
work is similar to Giesecke and Groß’ (2003) “integration scenario”, and to Schmid and 
Gazier’s (2002) “transitional labour market theory” though both of these theories offer 
predictions for the entire labour market. The integration scenario postulates a win-win 
situation for both employers and employees on the introduction of temporary contracts, 
with temporary contracts allowing employers to fluctuate the supply of labour in 
accordance to demand, as well as lowering costs. Employees are seen to benefit from a 
more open market and from the products of a more efficient economy, the combination 
of which should lead to greater transitions between atypical and standard contract 
employment (Schmid and Gazier 2002).  Further examples of research which is 
consistent with an ‘integration scenario’ include the following. In the Netherlands Zijl, 
van den Berg and Heyma (2004) find temporary work to shorten the duration of 
unemployment. In West Germany, Hagen (2003) finds temporary work to lead to the 
standard employment contract and McGinnity, Mertens and Gundert (2005) establish 
convergence in the labour market outcomes of West German fixed-term and permanent 
workers overtime.     
 
Theories Predicting a Trap 
Broadly the theories and findings reviewed below suggest that temporary work is a 
‘trap’ offering few opportunities for upward progression.  
 
Evidence from employer surveys reveal significant proportions of employers use 
temporary contracts to provide external flexibility, i.e. to increase or decrease the size 
of their workforce. Employers have been found to use temporary workers to fill short-
term vacancy gaps and staff absences and to adjust to workload fluctuations, be they 
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seasonal or due to fluctuations in product markets (Houseman 2001; Houseman 
Kalleberg and Erickcek 2003; Olsen and Kalleberg 2004). These are all situations 
where the nature of the job is short-term and where we have less reason to expect 
temporary jobs to lead to permanent employment.  
 
Type-of-contract segmentation theories (Polavieja 2001, 2003; Giesecke and Groß 
2003) also predict reduced transitions to permanent contract employment, though they 
also articulate the segmenting effect that contract type has on market structure. Both 
theories have their origin in dual labour market (Doeringer and Piore 1985; Piore and 
Sabel 1984) and segmentation theories (Edwards 1979; Gordon, Edwards and Reich 
1982). These theories predict stark skills differences between workers in the ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ segments as a result of the different technological requirements of each 
sector. In the core market, production and employment are stable, though their stability 
requires both economies of scale and consistency in product demand to offset the costs 
of technological advancements required in the core market. In the peripheral market 
production is based on low-skill, low-cost labour that is hired and fired in accordance to 
fluctuations in product demand. Proponents of this perspective argue that the flexibility 
required in the secondary sector is likely to be obtained through the generation of 
temporary work, which by definition is hired and fired with greater ease. Polavieja 
(2001, 2003) develops his theoretical position to incorporate the role that institutional 
context plays in the stratification of labour markets, with type-of-contract segmentation 
most likely to occur in markets where dismissal costs for permanent employment are 
high relative to temporary employment. For the four countries analysed here this is 
most likely to affect German and French employers, though they face considerable 
procedural inconveniences on the termination of permanent contracts rather than high 
dismissal costs (OECD 2004). 
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Previous research which suggests that temporary employment is most likely to lead to 
further unemployment includes the following. Using French data, Blanchard and 
Landier (2002) analyse changes in the working conditions of fixed-term contract work 
for young workers. They found decreasing probabilities of moving from fixed-term 
work to permanent work over the 1990s while the probability of remaining in fixed-
term employment was found to increase for the same time period. Giesecke and Groß in 
a series of papers (2003, 2004) find temporary workers more likely than permanent 
workers to become unemployed and to obtain further temporary contracts, using West 
German and UK data. Scherer (2004) finds a similar dynamic in Italy, with temporary 
workers more exposed to unemployment and labour market drop-out than permanent 
workers.ii   
 
The theories reviewed present us with competing hypotheses concerning temporary 
workers’ propensity for mobility to permanent contracts. From the perspective of 
screening theories and of transitional labour markets we would expect temporary 
workers to be quite likely to make transitions to permanent contract employment 
(corresponding with the ‘bridging thesis’), while segmented market theories lead us to 
expect temporary workers to be peripheral market occupants with reduced access to 
permanent contracts (corresponding with the ‘marginalisation thesis’). Both theories 
also offer us competing expectations of temporary workers’ unemployment risks. 
Screening theories lead us to expect a proportion of temps, those who after probation 
failed their employers’ expectations, to be at risk of unemployment. Crucially, this 
theory also leads us to expect unemployment risk to be associated with unobserved 
criteria, such as motivation or collegiality; attributes which can only be determined on 
probation. Screening theories, therefore, lead us to expect little observed difference 
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between temporary workers who make transitions to unemployment and those who do 
not. Conversely, market segmentation theories lead us to expect a strong tendency for 
temporary employees to be exposed to unemployment. Segmentation theories also lead 
us to expect stark differences between the attributes of individual workers exposed to 
unemployment.  
 
While the theories reviewed suggest that institutional structures will influence both; the 
utilities employers derive from temporary contract employment as well as the structure 
of the markets temporary workers find themselves in, few have investigated the 
differential impact of these structures on the transitions of temporary workers. This 
paper compares temporary workers chances of obtaining a permanent contract against 
their risk of experiencing unemployment, this is different from previous analyses that 
revealed the extent to which temporary workers faced an inferior market to permanent 
workers (i.e. Giesecke and Gross (2003) for Germany and the United-Kingdom; and 
Scherer (2004) for Italy). This paper also aims to determine whether some markets are 
more supportive of temporary workers’ transitions and if so, which institutional 
components appear to offer support. A review of the institutional components of the 
countries chosen for the analysis is presented in the next section. 
 
3. Divergence or Convergence? How Different can Labour Markets Be?  
There is a tendency to attribute between-country differences in labour market outcome 
to between-country differences in employment protection legislation (EPL) (Grubb and 
Wells 1993; OECD 1999, 2002). Broadly, countries with rigid EPL, such as Germany 
and France, are expected to have low job-to-job mobility and high unemployment. 
Rigid EPL is seen as a cost for employers and therefore an impediment to demand-side 
market flexibility. Meanwhile, countries with flexible EPL, such as Denmark and the 
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United-Kingdom, are expected to have high job-to-job mobility and lower 
unemployment as a result of their more ‘business friendly’ institutional structure. While 
the debate has become more nuanced, with the economic and social benefits of EPL 
increasingly recognised (i.e. Fella 2004); the role of educational and industrial relation 
systems can sometimes be marginalised. This paper hopes to reveal the impact of both 
EPL as well as education and industrial relations systems on the market outcomes of 
temporary workers. We analyse countries with different levels of EPL as well as 
different systems of skilling and industrial relations. Denmark and the United Kingdom 
are examples of flexible economies while France and Germany are examples of rigid 
economies. Meanwhile the industrial relations and educational systems of Denmark and 
Germany tend to be regarded as supportive of workers’ transitions to employment 
(Müller and Gangl 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001), whereas this is not the case in either 
France (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin and Tåhlin 2001; Visser, Dufour, Mouriaux and 
Subilieu 2000) or the United-Kingdom (Heath and Cheung 1998; Deakin and Reed 
2000).  
 
3.1 Employment protection legislation and demand-side flexibility 
Rigid employment legislation is thought to decrease job-to-job transitions and increase 
unemployment risk for non-permanent workers (e.g., OECD 2004). In France and 
Germany, dismissal regulations for permanent workers stipulate notice periods based 
on measures such as tenure, age and job type; additionally the employer needs to 
specify a reason for dismissal. Moreover, in Germany, the works council (Betriebsrat) 
will typically be involved in the dismissals procedureiii, while in France this is not 
necessarily the caseiv. German and French employers, however, do not face large 
redundancy payments. German employees are not automatically entitled to redundancy 
pay and French employees are only entitled to quite low payments of 3 days pay per 
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year of service. Though in principle these forms of employment protection might make 
temporary workers an attractive source of external flexibility, legislators have sought to 
cap the maximum duration of temporary contracts to 24 months in Germany and 18 
months in France. This cap, however, may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing temporary workers unemployment risk at the end of their contracts. The 
situation is quite different in Denmark and the UK where both temporary and 
permanent employees have low levels of employment protection. There are few 
procedural inconveniences in the termination of employment contracts and end-of-
contract payments are low to non-existent in both countries even after considerable 
years of service (OECD 2002).v Moreover, there are few legislative specifications 
concerning the length of temporary contracts, and few limitations to the number of 
times an employee can be re-employed on successive temporary contracts. vi  
 
Rigid EPL is also likely to encourage the use of temporary contracts as extended 
probationary periods particularly when trial periods before eligibility to unfair 
dismissals are short. In Germany and France the trial period for permanent contracts is 
6 months and 1.5 months respectively, and both countries have relatively stringent 
criteria in their definitions of an unfair dismissal. Meanwhile, both Denmark and the 
UK have much longer probationary periods, 10.5 and 24 months, and crucially their 
definition of an unfair dismissal is not as stringent (OECD 2004, p. 110).  
 
These components of EPL reviewed suggest that employers in Germany and France are 
more likely to use temporary employment as both a means of obtaining external 
flexibility and also as a means of obtaining an extended period of probation than in 
either Denmark or the United-Kingdom.  
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3.2 Coordination in Educational and Industrial Relation Systems 
While some argue that rigid EPL will lead to market failure, the varieties of capitalism 
literature (Soskice 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001), challenges this assertion. This 
literature identifies two different market economies: coordinated and liberal market 
economies (CMEs and LMEs respectively). The authors explain how ‘rigid’ EPL can 
support coordinated economies; where employers, strong unions and the state ensure a 
match between skill formation and employer demand for firm and industry-specific 
skills. From this perspective market ‘rigidity’ fulfils; employees’ needs for security - 
encouraging them to invest in specific skills, as well as; employers’ needs for a highly 
trained workforce. Meanwhile the coordinated industrial relations system ensures that 
employers provide their workers with further portable skills and that these investments 
are not lost due to poaching (Soskice 1999). Flexible markets, or ‘LMEs’, on the other 
hand cannot provide the incentives for specific skill investment as a result of low job 
security, poor coordination between the state and employers and weak trade unions. 
Here the educational systems are rather seen to produce general skills, with skills 
directly relevant to firms’ needs obtained through work experience. This perspective 
leads us to expect support for temporary workers’ transitions to permanent employment 
in countries where coordinated economies impart desired and recognisable skills.  
 
In both the ‘variety of capitalism’ literature, as well as literature on the transition from 
school-to-work (i.e. Müller and Gangl 2003), Germany and Denmark are identified as 
having coordinated educational systems that; support stable occupational careers and 
low youth unemployment (i.e. Gangl et al. (2003) for Germany; vii and Cort (2002) and 
Enevoldsen (1989) for Denmark). Meanwhile, the educational system in the United 
Kingdom is described as uncoordinated, with an underdeveloped vocational training 
system relative to Denmark and Germany. Rather, a large portion of occupationally 
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relevant skills are acquired through work experience with the link between educational 
credentials and market outcome comparatively weak (Heath and Cheung 1998). While 
some have tried to characterise the French educational system as coordinated (Hancke 
and Soskice 1996) others accuse it of failing to provide workers with relevant skills 
(Goux and Maurin 1998); with the locus of coordination found amongst its upper 
echelons. Compounding this dynamic is a training system described as dualistic 
(DiPrete, Goux, Maurin and Tåhlin, 2001).  
 
Crucial to the success of a coordinated economy is the character of its trade unions 
which are expected to be supportive of all workers, including temporary workers. As 
with the education system, Germany and Denmark, have coordinated and consensual 
trade union movements. French trade unions, on the other hand, are far from consensual 
(Crouch and Streeck 1997) and while trade union coverage is high, their ability to 
enforce agreements is diminished with only one-in-ten employees members of trade 
unions (Visser et al. 2000). Trade unions in the United Kingdom are also comparatively 
weak, and while trade union density is somewhat higher than in France, with 
approximately one-third of workers members of a trade union (Ebbinghaus and Visser 
2000, p.63), English trade unions tend to have little to no say in market management 
(Deakin and Reed 2000).  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
1- An analysis of employment protection legislation, in isolation of other institutional 
features, led us to expect temporary workers in the ‘flexible economies’ of Denmark 
and the United-Kingdom to be the most likely to obtain permanent employment relative 
to temporary workers in the ‘rigid economies’ of Germany and France. Rigid 
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employment protection legislation is thought to decrease overall job-to-job mobility 
and increase unemployment risk for outsiders.  
2- However, once we bring in the competing arguments from the varieties of capitalism 
literature, which suggest that rigid employment protection legislation is supportive of a 
coordinated economy, we have reason to expect the coordinated education and 
industrial relations systems of Denmark and Germany to provide the most supportive 
structures for temporary workers. Coordinated economies are thought to improve the 
match between workers’ capabilities and firms’ requirements; whilst their unions are 
expected to support the interests of all workers.  
3- Nonetheless, it is important to note that not all ‘rigid economies’ are coordinated 
economies. France, with its rigid EPL, does not possess a coordinated or consensual 
union movement, nor is its educational system comparable to the German and Danish 
systems. For these reasons we can expect French temporary workers to be the most 
exposed to market risk. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
The analyses are run on the final seven waves of the European Community Household 
Panel Survey (ECHP), a standardised comparative cross-national survey conducted in 
the Member States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of 
the European Communities (EUROSTAT). The samples were drawn by each member 
state as simple random samples, with information collected from respondents in 
interviews in each panel year (1994-2001). The panel was not supplemented by new 
samples to counteract sample attrition given its relatively short data window.  We do 
not use the first wave of the ECHP, 1994, as they did not ask contract type in the first 
wave. We define temporary workers as all workers who are on fixed-term or other 
short-term contract. The numbers were not sufficient for us to conduct separate 
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analyses for different types of temporary contract. In principle the sample excludes all 
workers on training schemes or in apprenticeships, as contract status was only asked of 
employees. Nonetheless it is possible that workers on apprenticeships have incorrectly 
classified themselves as temporary workers. While previous analyses using the ECHP 
have dropped respondents less than 29 years to ensure that apprenticeships and 
university students are excluded (Dieckhoff 2007), such a strategy was not possible 
here given the high proportions of young workers in our sample.  
 
The statistical technique applied, event history analysis (Allison 1984; Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995), allows us examine the transition rates of temporary workers to the 
standard employment contract and to unemployment. The methodology controls for 
right censored data, that is data which identifies when an event began but not when it 
ended. The key statistical concept within event history analysis is of the 
hazard/transition rate: the conditional likelihood that an event takes place at time 
interval 1 tt , conditional on it not having occurred before time t . We apply 
‘competing risks models’ to analyse the transitions of temporary workers to permanent 
contract employment and to unemployment. Competing risk models treat all exits other 
than the one we are interested in, to inactivity or education for instance, as censored. 
The models applied are continuous time models; in a competing risk format these 
models assume that each destination-specific hazard is independent. Tests were 
conducted to ensure that a continuous time format, rather than a discrete time format, 
offered adequate descriptions of the data. We chose to apply the piecewise constant 
exponential model as it relaxes the assumptions concerning the distribution of the 
hazard function by allowing the hazard to vary between specified segments of the time-
axis. This allows us to establish whether the risk of exiting a temporary contract to 
unemployment, for instance, increases or decreases through time. The functional form 
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of the model was also chosen on the basis of an empirical investigation of model fit, 
with the piecewise exponential model tested against the standard exponential and the 
Weibull. viii The formal specification for a piecewise constant exponential model is the 
following: 
 
  ljkjkjkljk itifVtr   exp  
 
For each transition from status j to status k (j,k) jkl  is a constant associated with the 
time period l. jkV  is a vector of covariates  and  jk  is a vector of covariates assumed 
not to vary across the segments of time.  
 
Given the short-term nature of temporary employment, it was vital to use the 
information the dataset provides indicating whether job mobility occurred between 
panel years as well as the information provided at panel year. Job start and end 
information was available between panel years as was information on unemployment 
spells and their duration between panel yearsix. Failure to use this data is likely to offer 
an incomplete view of temporary workers’ market transitions, though it also means that 
multiple incidences of unemployment or job mobility between panel years will go 
unrecorded. Nonetheless, this method provides greater detail than those that only use 
information at panel year. The dependent variable, the duration of the individual in a 
temporary contract, was constructed in the following manner: the first recorded job 
start date was set as the starting point of the dependent variable. The date at which the 
job ended was collected in later waves of the panel, as was the event at job-end, be it 
unemployment or permanent contract employment. In instances of non-response on 
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job-stop date, we approximated job-end dates as equal to the interview date of the panel 
year when they exhibited changes in their labour force status.  
 
The ability of respondents to correctly relay information in the past, such as job-start or 
job-end dates is a concern for researchers (Gershuny and Hannan 1997; Davies and 
Dale 1994). Nonetheless, as incorrect recall is most likely to occur after a period of 
three years (Elias 1996), and the nature of temporary employment meant that almost no 
temporary workers gave a job-start date greater than three years from the interview 
date, the risk of incorrect recall is expected to be rather small for the sample analysed. 
     
Table A1 presents the distribution for the change of status variable for each country 
analysed. We find that, other than censored cases, the most common destination states 
are to a permanent contract and to unemployment. This paper limits itself to the 
analysis of these two outcomes for two reasons. First, cell size restrictions prevent us 
from conducting a comparative analysis to the other destination states. Second, the 
paper chose to compare two clearly negative and positive outcomes of temporary 
employment, with a transition to further temporary employment or to economic 
inactivity more difficult to classify as troublesome than a transition to unemployment. 
The assumptions being that a temporary job is better than no job; and that a transition to 
inactivity does not imply a similar level of ‘social disqualification’ as time spent in 
unemployment (i.e. Gallie and Paugam 2000).  
 
The dataset was created to maximise on cell size given the small number of workers in 
temporary contracts. We increased our temporary worker observations by allowing 
respondents’ job start dates to vary beyond the first wave of the panel. This allowed us 
to maximise cases by (1) using panel inflow and (2) using labour market information on 
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respondents who in the first wave of the panel were not in employment. It should be 
noted that the statistical software applied, STATA Special Edition 8, allows one to 
specify when each respondent becomes at risk of making a transition. Essentially this 
means that an individual who is in a temporary job in year 1 and remains in that job for 
12 months will be measured according to the same ‘clock’ as someone who is not at 
risk of making a transition until year 2, as a result of their status as panel inflow, for 
instance. Sensitivity tests were carried out, nonetheless, to determine whether 
temporary workers who began their jobs in later years of the survey had similar 
employment durations, we found no tendency for different rates of tenure between 
years, no doubt due to the short-term nature of temporary contracts.  
 
Finally, non-random sample attrition can represent one of the main pitfalls of using 
panel data. However, recent research on attrition within the ECHP has found no 
difference in the attrition rates of different labour force status groups (Gallo Mastrovita 
and Siciliani 2004). While the authors did find some evidence on non-random panel 
attrition they ultimately concluded that the longitudinal weights provided with the 
ECHP correct for any resulting bias (Gallo et al. 2004). Nonetheless, when we ran our 
estimations with these weights, they did not affect our results.  
 
Variables Used 
Human Capital Variables- We include education level as a categorical variable, with 
third level education excluded as the reference category.x Possession of formal skills 
training is introduced as a time varying variable.xi These variables should allow us to 
establish whether more educated/skilled workers are more likely to make transitions to 
permanent employment and also whether workers’ skills protect them from transitions 
to unemployment.  
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Demographic variables- Age and its square are introduced to the model, with age 
squared introduced to capture any non-liniarities in workers transitions. Gender is also 
added to the model in an effort to determine whether women are more likely than men 
to make certain types of transition. xii 
Labour Market Variables- Occupational status is included in the models to control for 
variations in the transitions of different grades of worker. The occupational 
classification used is based on the ISCO-88 occupational categorisation. xiii We 
distinguish between the public and private sector to identify potential difference in 
outcome by sector, with the public sector frequently thought of as a protected market. 
Working-time is included with a distinction made between those working more or less 
than 30 hours a week. A dichotomous variable measuring respondents’ exposure to 
unemployment prior to current job start was also included to assess the implications of 
a spell of unemployment for temporary workers’ future transitions. In the pooled multi-
country analyses we generated weights to ensure that each country provided 
proportional samples. Tables with the covariate means for our temporary worker 
sample are presented in the appendix (table A1).  
 
5. Findings 
5.1 Bridge or Trap? Relative Hazards to Permanent Employment and to Unemployment 
Does temporary employment lead to unemployment or can temporary workers expect 
to obtain a permanent job at the end of their contract? Are there differences between 
temporary workers, with lower skilled workers very unlikely to obtain a permanent job? 
Finally, which country offers the best prospects for temporary workers and can we 
attribute these prospects to institutional structures? These questions are answered in the 
following sections.  
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Figure 1 shows the proportions of temporary workers who make a transition to 
permanent employment by country. Note that if no workers obtained a permanent job 
the line would remain parallel to the x-axis. We find the majority of temporary workers 
obtain a permanent job within the observation period. West German and UK temporary 
workers are slightly more likely to enter a permanent contract relative to temporary 
workers in either Denmark or France and French workers exhibit the lowest rates of 
transition to permanent contract employment.  
 
<FIGURE 1 HERE > 
 
Figure 2 presents the proportions of temporary workers who make a transition to 
unemployment by country for the same time period as that reviewed in figure 1: 60 
months. We find UK temporary workers to have the lowest transition rates to 
unemployment while French temporary workers have the highest transition rate. Tests 
revealed the survival curves for both figures to be significantly different.  
 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
What figure 1 and figure 2 do not make clear is the relative proportion of temporary 
workers who at the end of their contracts become unemployed or accept a permanent 
job. Table 1 presents this statistic by identifying the difference in the survivor functions 
of temporary workers’ transitions to permanent employment or to unemployment at 
specific cut-offs on the time-axis. If the difference is equal to zero, there is no 
difference in the relative tendency for temporary workers to enter unemployment or 
obtain a permanent job, if it is greater than zero there is a tendency for temporary 
workers to make more transitions to permanent employment and if it is less than zero 
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they have a greater tendency to make transitions to unemployment. While we find a 
greater tendency for unemployment in most countries after 1 year, we also find this 
tendency to switch with time, after three years we find temporary workers become 
more likely to obtain a permanent contract. We find the ‘bridging function’ of 
temporary employment to be the strongest in West-Germany and the United 
Kingdom.xiv  We need to be cautious in this conclusion, however, as it is not robust to 
different specifications of the change of status variable. If we broaden our 
conceptualisation of non-integrative exits to include all transitions other than those to 
permanent employment: i.e. to education, to inactivity or to a second temporary job, we 
find temporary workers less likely to obtain a permanent contract in all countries save 
for West-Germany.  
 
The analysis in this section reveals the strong between-country differences in the 
relative risk of temporary work being a ‘bridge’ or a ‘trap’. The analyses in the 
following sections aim to identify whether multivariate analyses which control for 
differences in the composition of the temporary workforce equalise these differences. 
We start by looking at who gets permanent jobs and whether the cross-national 
differences identified in this section are a function of the lower skill profile of 
temporary workers in the France.  
 
5.2 Who Gets Permanent Jobs? 
The following section identifies the variables that account for the transitions of 
temporary workers to permanent jobs. We present six models, one for each country and 
the final two pooled models of all four countries. To ensure comparability the models 
are the same for each individual country analysis and the pooled analyses.  
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<TABLE 2 HERE>  
 
We had expected human capital variables to be strong predictors of temporary workers’ 
transitions to permanent employment though only find this to be the case for West 
German and UK temporary workers. In both these countries temporary workers with 
lower levels of education exhibit lower transition rates to permanent contract 
employment.xv Ultimately, the strongest predictors of temporary workers’ transitions to 
permanent employment relate to the type and grade of jobs temporary workers hold. 
These variables also show the strongest between-country variation. In Denmark and 
France temporary workers in manual occupations, the reference category, are less likely 
to make a transition to permanent contract employment than other occupational groups, 
with this tendency the most pronounced in France. This fits with our expectation that 
employers will use temporary employment for lower grades of worker to access 
external flexibility and in these situations we expect few transitions to permanent 
employment. Similarly, higher grades of worker are likely to be ‘on probation’, and 
once screened will be offered a permanent job. In West-Germany and the UK, however, 
we find temporary workers in the highest occupational positions to be less likely to 
make transitions to permanent employment than the reference group. Previous research 
on UK temporary workers’ transitions has also found some higher grades of worker to 
be less likely to make transitions to permanent employment (Booth et al. 2002, p. 203-
204) though the authors do not discuss these. It is suggested here that these results may 
be driven by higher professionals on temporary contracts of considerable duration such 
as consultancy, academic or research contracts. In France and West-Germany we find 
temporary workers in the private sector to be more likely to make a transition to a 
permanent contract than public sector workers. No similar effect is found for the other 
two countries. While in principle the sample excludes apprenticeships, it is possible that 
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some apprentices have incorrectly self-described as temporary workers. For this reason, 
we could attribute a portion of this finding to the considerable investment of the French 
state in active labour market programmes a large portion of which involve the 
generation of short-term contracts in the public sector, such as Contrat Emploi 
Solidarité and Contrat Emploi Jeunes. Both of these forms of contract have 
comparatively low training requirements relative to other active labour market 
programmes targeted at private sector employers (Gash 2003). Alternatively, we could 
attribute this finding to the generation of a buffer of temporary workers in the highly 
regulated public sector of both countries. xvi This is consistent with Giesecke and Groß 
(2004), who found public sector temporary workers to have higher risks of repeat spells 
of temporary employment and of unemployment in West Germany. Other findings of 
note include: the strong negative effect of previous exposure to unemployment on 
French temporary workers’ future transitions to permanent contract employment. This 
finding may be indicative of market segmentation where workers ability to move out of 
the temporary workforce is hindered by the conditions of that workforce. An analysis of 
the baseline hazards suggests that the risk of exiting a temporary contract to a 
permanent contract increases with time.  
 
5.3 Which Country Offers the Best Access to Permanent Jobs?   
The pooled multi-country models allow us to identify the country most supportive of 
temporary workers’ transitions to permanent employment. The first equation identifies 
the country most supportive of transitions to permanent employment by country 
without controlling for differences between workers, while the second controls for a 
series of covariates (table 3). We place French temporary workers as the reference 
category as we expect them to be the least likely to make integrative transitions. As the 
case numbers differ substantially between countries, the pooled models are weighted 
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with country weights with an average of 1. We find West German and Danish workers 
(at the .10 level) more likely to make transitions to permanent employment than French 
temporary workers. We also note that West German temporary workers appear to make 
the most transitions to permanent employment. Once we control for the differences in 
the composition of the temporary workforce we find that West German temporary 
workers remain the most likely to make transitions to permanent employment, and note 
that the between-country difference in this tendency is no longer significant for 
Denmark. As a pooled model assumes all covariates operate similarly across countries, 
interaction terms were introduced to determine the source of the West German effect. 
We found that the West German effect was largely a function of the disproportionately 
high transition rates of manual, skilled manual and clerical workers relative to these 
workers in other countries (results not shown). Controlling for these interaction terms 
rendered the main West German effect insignificant. 
 
<TABLE 3 HERE>  
 
5.4 Who Becomes Unemployed?  
We already know that temporary workers are disproportionately exposed to 
unemployment relative to permanent workers, even after we control for observed (i.e. 
Giesecke and Groβ 2003) and unobserved (Gash and McGinnity 2007) differences. 
This is to be expected given the short-term nature of these contracts. What this section 
tries to uncover are (1) the differences between temporary workers in their 
unemployment risks and (2) the country within which temporary workers are most 
exposed to unemployment risk.  
 
<TABLE 4 HERE>  
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Table 4 identifies the variables which increase temporary workers transitions to 
unemployment by country. As with the previous models we added human capital 
variables to determine whether skills or education influenced workers transitions, and 
added demographic variables to identify whether age or gender was predictive. As with 
the previous analyses these variables were not found to be very revealing, though we 
did find lower educated workers more exposed to unemployment in France. Temporary 
workers with formal training were also less likely to become unemployed in Denmark. 
The strongest predictor, in each model and for each country, is the presence of a spell 
of unemployment before the start of a temporary job. This suggests that a portion of the 
temporary workforce is engaged in cycles of unemployment and temporary 
employment. Other notable findings include the decreased likelihood of unemployment 
for professional workers in the United-Kingdom, and the increased exposure to 
unemployment of reduced hour workers in France. While the results would appear to 
suggest the opposite tendency for reduced hour workers in the United Kingdom this is 
more likely to reflect the eligibility criterion for unemployment benefits in the United 
Kingdom. Many part-time workers are ineligible for unemployment benefits in the UK 
and are therefore unlikely to identify themselves as unemployed at the end of their 
contracts. xvii 
 
5.5 Which Country Presents the Greatest Unemployment Risk?   
Table 5 reveals the country which presents temporary workers with the greatest 
unemployment risk. The first model includes dichotomous variables identifying 
temporary workers as; Danish, English or West German, with the baseline hazards 
controlling for variations in the hazard rate overtime. We place French temporary 
workers as the reference category as we expect the French regime to place them at the 
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greatest unemployment risk. The second model controls for the same covariates used in 
the country specific models. Again the models include relative country weights. 
Without controls for variation in the composition of the temporary workforce we find 
English temporary workers considerably less likely to become unemployed than 
temporary workers in France. However, as model two reveals, this is a function of the 
composition of the temporary workforce: once we control for various covariates we 
loose the significance of the country level dummy. Finally, it should be noted that we 
tried to introduce a variable which controlled for the different unemployment rates 
between countries but found it to have little effect on the findings overall. We also note, 
however, the recognised difficulties in introducing institutional level factors into multi-
country models, with the institutional frequently co-linear with the national dummy 
variables (Russell and O’Connell 2001).  
 
<TABLE 5 HERE>  
 
6. Discussion 
This paper sought to reveal whether temporary contracts provide a ‘bridge’ to 
permanent work, or whether they are a ‘trap’: placing workers at future unemployment 
risk. It also sought to identify whether current classifications of countries as 
economically rigid or flexible offered adequate predictions of market dynamics for 
temporary workers. It did this by comparing the outcomes of temporary workers in four 
countries with different levels of employment protection legislation as well as different 
education and industrial relations systems.  
 
When we compared the relative rates of transition to either permanent employment or 
unemployment, we found temporary employment to be a ‘bridge’ rather than a ‘trap’ in 
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each country. We also found strong differences by country with West Germany and the 
United Kingdom, two countries on opposing poles of the OECD’s employment 
flexibility ranking, providing the best chances of obtaining a permanent contract 
relative to entering unemployment.  
 
However, temporary employment is not a one-way street to secure employment. When 
we broadened our definition of a trap to include all other non-integrative exits (i.e. to 
labour market inactivity or to further temporary employment) the odds of obtaining 
secure employment dropped dramatically for all countries except for West-Germany. 
While West-Germany did not protect its temporary workforce from unemployment any 
better than the other countries analysed (figure 2 and table 5), it did provide the best 
routes to permanent employment.  
 
Our first hypothesis was derived from standard theories of labour market dynamics 
which suggest that rigid EPL will inhibit temporary workers’ chances of obtaining a 
permanent contract and will increase their risk of unemployment. This certainly appears 
to describe the situation for French temporary workers, but clearly is not applicable to 
the German context despite its rigid employment law. Our second hypothesis was 
derived from the varieties of capitalism literature. This literature suggests that rigid 
employment protection can be supportive of coordinated market relations; improving 
the match between workers’ capabilities and firms’ skill requirements whilst defending 
the interests of all workers. While Denmark does not have rigid EPL (it does, however, 
provide security from unemployment another key feature of a coordinated economy) 
both it and Germany do have highly coordinated trade union movements and education 
systems. This appears to offer some insight into the high transition rates to permanent 
employment in Germany despite its rigid employment legislation. While in principle 
  26 
the analyses excludes workers on apprenticeships, it is possible that some have 
incorrectly self-described as standard temporary employees. Moreover, while this is 
true of all countries, it is most likely to be the case in Germany given the size and scope 
of its apprenticeship system. Nonetheless, even if the German result is due to rogue 
apprentices it is still reflective of its education and training system; one which ensures 
that high proportions of temporary workers on apprenticeships go on to obtain 
permanent contracts. Our third hypothesis concerned our expectation that French 
temporary workers would be the least well served from their country’s combination of 
rigid employment law and a poorly coordinated economy. While the French temporary 
workforce was the most exposed to unemployment (Figure 2) this finding was found to 
be a function of its composition (table 5).   
 
Conclusion 
The vast majority of research into the quality of temporary employment, relative to 
permanent employment, suggests that it is of inferior status on a broad range of 
indicators. This paper does not dispute these findings. However, this paper did seek to 
analyse one of the “redeeming features” of temporary employment, its supposed ability 
to integrate workers to the standard employment contract and did so in four European 
countries with very different strategies towards market management.  
 
Essentially we established that the majority of temporary workers do, eventually, get 
permanent jobs. This is not to say, nonetheless, that those who have experienced 
temporary work will not experience negative repercussions in the longer term. The 
current analysis did not reveal the relative quality of the jobs they entered, nor did it 
identify the stability of these new-found permanent jobs.  
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Finally, our predictions of national variation in market outcome were poorly served by a 
simple assessment of employment protection legislation. Germany, with its rigid 
employment law, appeared to provide some of the best opportunities for permanent 
employment. Employment research that engages with institutional context should not, 
therefore, limit itself to the ease with which employers can hire or fire workers; national 
variation in education and industrial relation systems are also vital to our understanding 
of market outcome.  
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i
 The statistical analyses is restricted to West Germany given the ongoing differences in the labour market 
performance of East and West Germany. This is a common strategy in the literature on temporary 
employment in Germany, i.e. (McGinnity, Mertens and Gundert 2004; Giesecke and Groß 2003). 
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Nonetheless, as both regions have shared the same institutional systems since German reunification we do 
not distinguish East from West Germany when we speak of Germany’s institutional structure. 
ii
 The author also investigates West German temporary employment though these results are unusual. The 
author finds temporary workers in Germany to be less likely to become unemployed than permanent 
workers (p. 380) and also finds them less likely to make a transition to labour market inactivity. These 
findings are different to previous research on temporary workers labour market transitions (Giesecke and 
Groβ 2003, 2004; McGinnity et al. 2005).  
iii
 Dismissals are regulated by the Dismissal Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) of 1951, as amended 
in 1969 (see Schömann et al., 1998). The description of regulations described here excludes the period 
from 1996-1999, when dismissal protection was somewhat modified. In addition, in January 2004 new 
legislation raised the minimum number of employees from 6 to 11, and new regulations have been 
introduced to facilitate redundancy payment settlements without going to court. 
iv
 Since the 1986 reform of the Code du Travail, the statute governing employment in France, there have 
been two separate procedures specified for dismissal of employees. These are divided into dismissals for 
economic reasons (licenciement pour motif économique) and for individual reasons (licenciement pour 
motif disciplinaire/personnelle). Previously a labour inspector was required to witness meetings between 
employers and employee concerning dismissals, now this is only the case for dismissals for economic 
reasons. Dismissals for economic reasons are generally those concerning firms’ financial inability to 
continue the individuals post. In these instances the employer is required to offer their former employees 
re-training contracts (Schömann et al., 1998).  
v
 In Denmark, blue-collar workers are ineligible for severance pay no matter the length of service. White-
collar workers on the other hand are eligible but only if they have been employed with the same employer 
for a considerable amount of time: after twelve years of service they are entitled to one month of pay 
(OECD, 1999). 
vi
 While recent legislation in the UK, the 2002 Fixed-Term Employees Regulations, prevents employers 
from hiring the same worker on successive contracts over a four-year period, this legislation is not pertinent 
to the time period analysed.  
vii
 While this remains true for the period in question, the transition has become less co-ordinated in recent 
years (Ryan, 2001). 
viii
 We estimated plots of pseudoresiduals for each type of model. Cox and Snell (1968) developed the 
means by which residuals could be estimated from event history data and their algorithm is used in the 
Stata software applied. While the analyses suggested the piecewise constant exponential offered the best 
‘fit’; plots of pseudoresiduals are not strictly goodness of fit tests (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995 p.210). 
ix
 The precise variables used were: the month (PE011) and year (PE012) when current job started; the 
existence of an unemployment spell (PE014) and its duration before the current job (PE015) and; the month 
(PJ002) and year (PJ003) the person stopped working in their previous job.  
x
 The categories of the education variable correspond to ISCED codes: 5-7 (third level education) 3-4 
(upper secondary education) 0-2 (lower secondary education). 
xi
 The precise wording of the question is: ‘Have you had formal training or education that has given you 
skills needed for your present type of work? Y/N’. 
xii
 It was unfortunately not possible to conduct separate analyses by gender due to cell size. Nonetheless, 
previous analyses on temporary workers’ transitions have used a similar strategy to the one here (Hagan, 
2003; McGinnity, Mertens and Gundert 2005; Giesecke and Groβ 2003), though others have found 
considerable differences by sex (Gash, Mertens and Romeu-Gordo 2007; Giesecke and Groβ 2004). 
xiii
 Industrial sector was introduced to the models but was eventually dropped as the coefficients were 
insignificant and when tested had no effect on the model overall. 
xiv
 Note this statistic was calculated by subtracting the survivor function of the transition to permanent 
employment from the survivor function of the transition to unemployment at the same cut-off on the time-
axis.  
xvIt is likely that educational level has little predictive power due to the failure of the ECHP to update 
information on educational level between the first and the fifth panel of the survey. Given that the 
observation window for our temporary worker sample begins in the second wave of the ECHP we already 
expect the educational level variable to be less precise. 
xvi
 In Germany civil servants can expect life-long employment under special legislation, the 
Bundesbeamtengesetz. This is also the case for the French civil service. 
xvii
 Many part-time workers in the UK do not make national insurance contributions as their earnings are 
below the qualifying threshold. For this reason many part-time workers are not eligible for 
unemployment insurance at the end of their contracts. Moreover, unemployment assistance is means 
tested with workers who are in a partnership with a worker (which is true of the majority of part-time 
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workers) unlikely to be provided with unemployment benefit if their partner is deemed to have sufficient 
income to provide for them both.  
